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BOMB THROWING, DEMOCRATIC THEORY, AND
BASIC VALUES—A NEW PATH TO
PROCEDURAL HARMONIZATION?
Richard Marcus
ABSTRACT—From the beginning of his career, Marty Redish has been
something of a bomb thrower, repeatedly challenging legal orthodoxy.
During the last decade, democratic theory has been at the center of many of
his challenges to widely accepted procedural rules. Meanwhile, American
proceduralists are gradually waking up to the reality that the rest of the
world handles procedure quite differently. Redish’s theoretical challenge to
U.S. procedure—premised on political theory—therefore also corresponds
to efforts to harmonize American procedure more closely with that of the
rest of the world. But the United States remains stubbornly resistant to that
harmonization, and even limited shifts in the direction Redish endorses
excite very vigorous opposition. This Article recognizes the ways in which
Redish’s democratic theory could lead to greater harmonization with the
rest of the world, but contrasts several other political theory explanations
for American exceptionalism that support retaining our current methods. It
concludes by recognizing that this tension presents considerable challenges
to American rulemakers.
AUTHOR—Professor Richard Marcus holds the Horace O. Coil ’57 Chair
in Litigation at University of California, Hastings College of the Law. For
nearly a quarter century, he and Professor Redish have been coauthors of a
leading civil procedure casebook. He also is coauthor of a leading complex
litigation casebook and of several volumes of the Federal Practice &
Procedure treatise (“Wright & Miller”). Since 1996, he has served as
Associate Reporter of the U.S. Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, working on possible rule changes dealing with discovery,
class actions, and other matters. In this Article, however, he is speaking
only for himself and not for the Advisory Committee or anyone else.
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INTRODUCTION
Marty Redish has long been a bomb thrower. By that, I mean that he
has launched trenchant critiques of established doctrine that shake up the
academic and, sometimes, the judicial establishment. When he was new to
academia, for example, he established himself with major articles—
bombs—about the right to jury trial,1 the Erie doctrine,2 the timing of
appellate review,3 the Anti-Injunction Act,4 and the proper handling of due
process limitations on personal jurisdiction.5
Many begin as bomb throwers but end up staid Establishment
defenders. Not so with Marty. He has persisted in his clear-eyed and
rigorous scrutiny of the solemn precedents in many fields, and has become
a giant in constitutional law and federal courts, in addition to civil
procedure, the only field I can claim to have mastered even partly.
In the last decade or so, Marty’s civil procedure bomb throwing,
broadly construed, has shifted from the focus of his first decade in
1

Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational
Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486 (1975).
2
Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the
Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977); see also Martin H. Redish, Continuing the Erie
Debate: A Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REV. 959 (1980).
3
Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 89 (1975).
4
Martin H. Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 717 (1977).
5
Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical
Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112 (1981).
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teaching. In particular, he has raised a series of challenges to the
foundations on which many of the principles of modern American civil
procedure have been built.6 In other words, he has invited us to get back to
basics, most recently by emphasizing the foundations of modern procedure.
As in his other endeavors, Marty has shaken those foundations. That’s what
good academic bomb throwers do.
I want to reflect on Marty’s recent challenges to orthodoxy, partly
from the perspective of one who has found himself laboring in the
vineyards of the procedure establishment, at least in relation to several of
the topics Marty has within his sights. In addition, I’ve had some exposure
(more than most American proceduralists) to efforts at procedural
harmonization in the rest of the world, and I approach these topics with that
effort in mind. In the process, I will take some liberties with Marty’s actual
positions, hopefully not too many, to elaborate on a theme that I take from
his recent writings. I will suggest that the combined effect of Redish’s
critiques could be seen as endorsing a revision of American procedure that
would move our practice toward harmonization with the rest of the world.
The contrasting attitude might be generalized as the procedure of
Continental Europe, which relies on precise specification of factual
allegations and evidentiary support, leaves fact-gathering to the judge
rather than party-controlled discovery, generally allows less generous
monetary relief, and permits the winner to recover its attorney’s fees.
Drawing then on this comparative perspective, I intend to offer some
political theory explanations for the persistence of American procedure in
what Marty (and much of the rest of the world) would likely call its erring
ways. And then I finish with brief reflections on the consequent messiness
of contemporary American procedure reform.
My basic point will be that we really need bomb throwers like Marty,
but that their striking insights may not regularly be followed to their logical
end points. Life is, in some ways, too messy for that.
I. AMERICAN PROCEDURAL EXCEPTIONALISM
Americans who dabble in comparative civil procedure rapidly learn
that the rest of the world—even our English cousins—find our practices
peculiar, perhaps bizarre.7 Many of us have learned to be diffident about
embracing American exceptionalism in many arenas—foreign policy and
military adventurism come to mind—and it may have come time for
American proceduralists to take a hard look at their insularity and isolation.
Within constitutional limits, we could do much to get into step with the rest
of the world.
6

See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the
Foundations of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV. 845 (2012).
7
See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized
Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (2005) (book review).
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But the elements of American exceptionalism should be identified at
the outset so that all can understand why they strike the rest of the world as
so incongruous. At least the following distinctive elements come
immediately to mind8:
Lax pleading standards. Since before all of us were born, the amount
of detail, much less proof, that a plaintiff has to include with her complaint
has been quite limited. Without belaboring the point, the introduction of
Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief” led in 1957 to the declaration in Conley v.
Gibson that a complaint should not be dismissed unless “it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.”9 As all know, the Court has recently
backtracked on this 1957 declaration,10 but the basic point is that American
pleading is far more lenient than most other countries’ standards. Opening
the litigation door is uniquely easy here.11
Broad discovery. Once the litigation door is opened, great treasures lie
within because broad discovery permits, perhaps invites, aggressive
inquiry.12 Rule 45 permits parties to use a subpoena to compel similarly
broad disclosure by nonparties as well as their adversaries.13 And they need
not get the judge’s say-so before they begin this effort. As Geoff Hazard
has observed, discovery has assumed an almost constitutional status in

8
Though I will offer some citations in support of these comparative characterizations, it seems
almost unnecessary to do so.
9
355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). For an examination of the seeming happenstance that this phrase
came to be included in this opinion, see Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley: Precedent by Accident, in
CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 295 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008).
10
See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007) (“retiring” the “no set of
facts” notion from Conley).
11
For proof of this point, consider Rule 12.1 of the Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, drafted
by the American Law Institute in collaboration with UNIDROIT: “The plaintiff must state the facts on
which the claim is based, describe the evidence to support those statements, and refer to the legal
grounds that support the claim, including foreign law, if applicable.” AM. LAW INST. & UNIDROIT,
PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE r. 12.1, at 111 (2006) [hereinafter
ALI/UNIDROIT]. Rule 12.3 adds: “The statement of the facts must, so far as reasonably practicable, set
forth detail as to time, place, participants, and events.” Id. r. 12.3, at 111. The commentary makes clear
that this provision requires much more than “notice pleading” under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. cmt. R-12A, at 111. This point is repeated in the text later. It is a basic point.
12
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (authorizing discovery so long as it is “reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence”). Contrast the explanation in the commentary to the
Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure of the stricter, fact-based pleading requirements: “[T]he facts
pleaded in the statements of claim and defense establish the standard of relevance for exchange of
evidence, which is limited to matters relevant to the facts of the case as stated in the pleadings.”
ALI/UNIDROIT, supra note 11, cmt. R-12A, at 111.
13
See FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
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recent decades.14 Indeed, some American courts have even suggested that
plaintiffs could validly file lawsuits in order to obtain discovery rather than
as a method of obtaining court-ordered relief.15
Jury trial. Sanctified in the Constitution, jury trial is distinctively
American. Most countries never had anything like it, or only recently got
something like it. Even England—the source of so much of our heritage—
moved away from jury trial in civil cases about a century ago.16 In the
United States, however, jury trial continues to reign supreme (at least in
theory), and courts only rarely can deprive juries of their final say. True,
for the last quarter century, summary judgment has assumed greater
importance,17 and the Daubert decision18 sometimes puts the brakes on the
use of innovative expert evidence by plaintiffs. But the abiding reality is
that most cases may go to a jury unless settled or decided on the pleadings
or summary judgment.
Pain and suffering damages. Economic damages—lost wages or
profits and out-of-pocket expenditures—can mount up in many cases in
many countries. But proof of them is often challenging, and routine
doctrine suggests that the value of lost items should be discounted and the
likelihood of future fortune (lost future earnings) should also. For most of
the world, that means that monetary recoveries in most cases are modest. In
the United States, however, tort law and other doctrines often permit
recovery of pain and suffering or emotional distress damages that far
outstrip any proven monetary losses.19 To some extent, that distinctive
reality results from our lack of a social insurance safety net.20 In any event,
14
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1694
(1998) (“Broad discovery is thus not a mere procedural rule. Rather it has become, at least for our era, a
procedural institution perhaps of virtually constitutional foundation.”).
15
See Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975) (noting, with seeming
approval, that “certain civil suits may be instigated for the very purpose of gaining information for the
public,” and adding that “[s]uch revelations should not be kept from the public”).
16
See, e.g., ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE
402 n.19 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that, by 1883, jury trial was available for only six causes of action, and
adding that “[j]ury trial declined because it was not being asked for”).
17
For discussion, see Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications
of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (2005).
18
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (directing federal judges to act
as “gatekeepers” to ensure that only reliable expert evidence reaches the jury). For the implementation
of this principle in the rules, see FED. R. EVID. 702.
19
For a critique, see Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece
of Our Tort System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401 (2004).
20
“The financial burden of litigants is different [in Germany] from the US as almost all European
systems offer legal aid or the chance to get legal cost insurance. Comprehensive social insurance and
welfare systems cover to a large extent damages which are in dispute at least in US personal injury class
actions.” Astrid Stadler, Aggregate Litigation—Group/Class Actions in Germany, in LITIGATION IN
ENGLAND AND GERMANY 79, 90 (Peter Gottwald ed., 2010). This sort of function for pain and suffering
has long been recognized. Thus, in his classic treatise, Professor Dobbs recognized: “[P]ain and
suffering awards . . . serve an eminently practical and important purpose in providing a fund from
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it is a critical factor in making the American contingent fee system work, as
caps on noneconomic damages have demonstrated because they deter
lawyers from taking cases that are expensive to litigate for plaintiffs who
can’t prove substantial lost future earnings.21
Punitive damages. As though emotional distress damages were not
sufficient leavening for litigation, American courts often permit additional
recoveries of punitive damages. This sort of litigation adventurism is nearly
unique to this country, but it has grown greatly in seeming importance in
recent decades.22 Other countries often refuse to enforce the punitive
damages portions of American judgments even if they are willing to
enforce the rest of the award.23
Class actions. To wrap much of the foregoing into a bigger bundle,
since 1966 the United States has had a more vibrant class action practice.
Largely unknown in other countries,24 and premised on the “opt-out”
provisions that make inaction sufficient to achieve membership in the
class,25 this procedural device could on occasion have a major effect. On
the one hand, it could magnify the impact of what would otherwise be
small claims. On the other hand, in the settlement mode, it could substitute
what in effect would be a privately designed claim resolution system for
the public court system.26

which the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees can be paid without drawing too heavily on that portion of the
award actually needed to pay medical bills or replace lost earnings.” DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 8.1(4), at 659–60 (2d ed. 1993).
21
See Rachel Zimmerman & Joseph T. Hallinan, As Malpractice Caps Spread, Lawyers Turn Away
Some Cases, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2004, at A1; see also Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort
Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1265 (2004) (using empirical
research to show how damage caps will harm the interests of vulnerable groups because they routinely
have limited “hard” damages proof).
22
The literature on punitive damages is vast. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges,
and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002); Joni Hersch & W. Kip
Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004).
23
See, e.g., Ernst C. Stiefel et al., The Enforceability of Excessive U.S. Punitive Damage Awards in
Germany, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 779, 780–81 (1991).
24
For a study of the recent interest in developing some sort of collective action procedure, albeit
one free of the “defects” of the American class action, see CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF
CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS (2008).
25
Thus, Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions are “mandatory” in the sense that class members are
not routinely offered a chance to opt out, and Rule 23(b)(3) class actions do require notice of class
certification, but the rule further provides that all class members are included in the class and bound by
the judgment unless they opt out. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). For Europeans, by way of contrast,
only an opt-in approach has been found to satisfy autonomy concerns, even with claims of minimal
value. See Stadler, supra note 20, at 84–85.
26
For reflection on the remarkable possibilities of settlement class actions, see Richard L. Marcus,
They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858 (1995).
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II. A PERFECT CURE OR A PERFECT STORM?
Those who evaluate American procedural exceptionalism tend to
regard the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 as the
critical watershed in creating what we have today. But it’s not so clear that
they were quite so revolutionary as we all suppose.
Certainly the framers did not say they were revolutionary; Charles
Clark instead sold the new rules as valuable, if somewhat modest,
improvements on existing regimes.27 As to some matters—particularly
pleading and discovery—the Federal Rules surely moved well beyond prior
arrangements. Professor Subrin, for instance, has detailed how the
discovery rules were revolutionary.28 But American discovery had long
been distinctive; as early as the 1870s, the German government protested
what it regarded as the unduly intrusive nature of American civil
discovery.29 And attitudes toward pleading sufficiency don’t seem to
depend entirely on rules. Though the adoption of the Federal Rules is
widely thought to have been a decisive break from the “fact pleading” of
the Field Code, states that retain code pleading may be considerably laxer
in their pleading requirements than the federal courts have been under the
Federal Rules standards. In California, for instance, it has long been agreed
that the state courts (operating under the code pleading regime adopted in
1872) have been much more forgiving than the federal courts in evaluating
the sufficiency of complaints.30 And states that model their procedures on
the Federal Rules have sometimes resisted the Supreme Court’s recent
interpretation of the federal pleading standards.31
But the mid-twentieth century did produce dramatic changes in
American government, and civil litigation was hardly exempted from the
27

See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 962–73 (1987) (describing the way in
which the framers of the rules looked to the more relaxed traditions of equity to avoid the technicalities
of common law procedure). Although Charles Clark, the chief drafter of the rules, was himself
committed to the use of litigation to do more than merely resolve private disputes, see id. at 966, “many
strands of the ideology of conservatives who initially sponsored the [Rules] Enabling Act coalesced
with the ideas of liberals who later participated in its enactment and implementation,” id. at 969.
28
Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 718–19 (1998) (describing the array of discovery
procedures authorized by the federal rules as unprecedented).
29
See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 971 (5th ed. 2011) (describing German protests in 1874).
30
I say this based on my practice experience in California in the 1970s and early 1980s.
31
See, e.g., Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 955 A.2d 1082, 1086 (Vt. 2008) (reaffirming its commitment
to the view that a complaint should not be dismissed unless the court is certain the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts justifying relief); McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 863–64 (Wash. 2010)
(refusing to follow the Supreme Court’s revision of the standard for motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim even though Washington’s civil procedure rules are modeled on the Federal Rules). But
see Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass. 2008) (following the Supreme Court’s
new approach).
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effects of that watershed era. The Federal Rules may thus be seen as a
significant aspect of this more general governmental metamorphosis.
A. The “Perfect Cure” View
So far as civil litigation is concerned, in general there has been much
applause for the new era that emerged from the mid-century reform era.
Along with many New Deal governmental programs, civil litigation
became the vehicle for much social change.32 Civil rights litigation led the
way, and other forms of social impact litigation followed. By the mid1970s, Professor Chayes was able to suggest that “the dominating
characteristic of modern federal litigation is that lawsuits do not arise out of
disputes between private parties about private rights. Instead, the object of
litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies.”33 And
Professor Fiss wrote around the same time that the courts should only be
concerned about articulating public values; resolving private disputes was,
in his view, “an extravagant use of public resources, and thus it seems quite
appropriate for those disputes to be handled not by courts, but by
arbitrators.”34
Thus, there was much enthusiasm for civil litigation as a perfect cure
for what ailed society. From initially being controversial, Brown v. Board
of Education became an icon attesting to the ways in which civil litigation
could move society forward and break through barriers that other parts of
government had not overcome.
At the same time, the whole notion of what should be regarded as the
“public interest” took on new aspects. For example, the emergence of
product liability theories might be characterized as simply a new breed of
private litigation, but increasingly it was handled as a method of prompting
improvements in product safety for all, seemingly introducing an important

32
Indeed, for some academics, enthusiasm for this new role for civil litigation antedated the New
Deal. Consider Professor Subrin’s description of the attitude of Dean Clark, who was chief drafter of
the Federal Rules:
As early as 1928, Clark began to look at law and litigation with the broader focus of an
emerging social reformer. Clark perceived litigation as designed for something more than the
purpose of merely resolving a dispute between two parties. In his first article describing his
empirical research, Clark wrote: “One of the most important recent developments in the field of
the law is the greater emphasis now being placed upon the effect of legal rules as instruments of
social control of much wider import than merely as determinants of narrow disputes between
individual litigants.” Unlike [David Dudley] Field, [drafter of the Field Code,] . . . Clark came
to perceive the need for government to play a more active role in society.
Subrin, supra note 27, at 966 (footnote omitted).
33
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284
(1976).
34
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 29–30 (1979).
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new ingredient.35 By the 1970s, Professor Chayes recognized this expanded
role for what he called “public law litigation”:
School desegregation, employment discrimination, and prisoners’ or
inmates’ rights cases come readily to mind as avatars of this new form of
litigation. But it would be mistaken to suppose that it is confined to these
areas. Antitrust, securities fraud and other aspects of the conduct of
corporate business, bankruptcy and reorganizations, union governance,
consumer fraud, housing discrimination, electoral reapportionment,
environmental management—cases in all these fields display in varying
degrees the features of public law litigation.36

Around the same time the Federal Rules took effect, another new
development began to make its presence felt. Coined in the early 1940s by
Jerome Frank,37 the concept of the “private attorney general” emerged as a
stimulus for efforts to seek social change or enforce regulatory
prescriptions through private litigation.38 In the 1970s, this notion
broadened to include the concept of the “public interest lawyer” pursuing
the sorts of litigation Professor Chayes applauded.
B. The “Perfect Storm” Reaction
Not everyone was applauding; the 1970s became a new watershed in
some attitudes towards these new aspects of civil litigation. For some, in
other words, American procedural exceptionalism had produced a perfect
storm rather than a perfect cure.39 By the mid-1970s, Chief Justice Burger
had inveighed against what he viewed as excesses in civil litigation. The
35

For discussion of these issues, see Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal
Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 647, 668–75 (1988). For an illustration of how “private”
litigation can serve a “public” regulatory purpose, see AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, DRIVEN TO SAFETY:
HOW LITIGATION SPURRED AUTO SAFETY INNOVATIONS (2010), which contends that private tort suits
resulted in safer cars. This effect might be compared to efforts by public regulatory agencies to improve
the safety of cars. Yet most would probably say that auto tort litigation is not “public law” litigation.
See W. Kip Viscusi, Overview, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 1, 1 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002)
(exploring what Professor Viscusi describes as a “new phenomenon”—litigation that “results in
negotiated regulatory policies to settle the suit or serves as a financial lever to promote support for
governmental policies”).
36
Chayes, supra note 33.
37
See Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320
U.S. 707 (1943).
38
See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters,
57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004).
39
See, e.g., Stephen Berry, Ending Substance’s Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for
Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 300 (1980); Milton
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The Twenty-Third
Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1971). Both these articles decry the extent to
which procedural developments seemed to have dominant importance that overshadowed substantive
concerns; the Berry article, for example, expressed the views of a Department of Justice lawyer that
these developments meant that substantive principles were “indentured” to procedural provisions.
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1976 Pound Conference was convened to examine these problems.40 Many
said that litigation was out of control and urged that American procedures
be curtailed to respond to the risks they caused. By the end of that decade,
formal proposals were afoot to narrow the scope of discovery.41
Meanwhile, the 1966 expansion of Rule 23, the class action rule, had been
followed fairly soon by a strong adverse reaction chronicled by Professor
Miller in 1979.42 Altogether, this collection of misgivings that surfaced in
the 1970s has not dissipated. The attitude is perhaps summed up in the title
of a book to be published by Yale University Press in 2013: The American
Illness.43 This is the “perfect storm” view.
From the perfect storm perspective, one might be tempted to conclude
that the adverse circumstances resulted from a mid-century conspiracy by
trial lawyers to endow themselves with the power to control the land. In
retrospect, however, there seems to be little reason to attribute such
foresight to those who produced significant changes in American civil
litigation. The framers of the Federal Rules, for example, were hardly a
revolutionary rabble. To the contrary, they were drawn from the highest
echelon of the private bar, mainly those who usually represented large
corporations (the entities supposedly most harmed by the new reality of
American litigation).44 And the American judiciary did not welcome all the
“revolutionary” changes with open arms; to the contrary, among federal
judges there was for nearly twenty years a rearguard reaction against
relaxed pleading standards that was scotched in 1957 by Conley v.
Gibson.45 Even in 1963–1966, when the class action rule was being revised,
few envisioned the manifold ways in which its new provisions could be
used.46
40
See Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (Apr. 7–9, 1976).
41
See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 753–60 (1998).
42
Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class
Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979).
43
THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW (F.H. Buckley ed., forthcoming May
2013). It bears mention that this view is far from universal. For an argument that recurrent assertions
that litigation—and particularly tort litigation—has hurt the American economy are not justified, see
Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 28 (2011).
44
See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 27, at 971–72 (reporting that the drafting committee that developed
the Federal Rules consisted of Dean Clark and four other law professors from elite law schools and nine
lawyers, most of whom were associated with what was then considered large firm practice).
45
355 U.S. 41 (1957). For a description of the rearguard insurgency by federal judges, see Richard
L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 433, 445 (1986).
46
For example, Professor Charles Alan Wright forecast in the early 1960s that Rule 23 would not
prove important even after amendment because class actions were so rare. See John K. Rabiej, The
Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 334 (2005).
Rabiej noted that “Professor Wright’s usually unerringly accurate prescience faltered on this occasion.”
Id. at 334 n.43.
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But the drumbeats of opposition to American exceptionalism have
continued from the 1970s to the present. For instance, a letter that was
recently submitted to the federal rulemakers asserts that, in 2008, “for each
$1 of profit earned, on average survey respondents spent between $0.18
and $0.31 on litigation costs.”47 A 2010 study conducted partly under
Northwestern University’s auspices found that multinational companies
had much higher litigation costs in the United States than in other countries
in which they operated.48
For another report from one present at the time of the 1960s amendments, consider what Professor
Arthur Miller told the Advisory Committee more than thirty years later. He testified at a hearing in
1997 about proposed Rule 23 amendments then under consideration and related his recollections about
the attitudes and expectations at the time the rule amendments were adopted in the 1960s:
[I]f anybody can claim to have been there at creation, I was there at creation. If anyone can
claim to tell you what was in Ben’s mind [referring to Ben Kaplan, Reporter of the Committee
at the time] or the Committee’s mind, John [Frank, a member of the Advisory Committee in the
1960s who also testified in 1997] comes close, but I yield not to John. Nothing was in the
Committee’s mind. And anyone who tells you that wondrous things were going on with direct
relevance to the year 1997, it’s good story telling. Just put yourself back in 1960 to ’63. Nothing
was going on. There were a few antitrust cases, a few securities cases. The civil rights
legislation was then putative.
You did not have due process legislation; you do not have safety legislation; you did not have
the environmental or consumer legislation. And the rule was not thought of as having the kind
of application that it now has.
That doesn’t tell you a thing about what the rule should be used for. But you can’t blame the
rule, because we have had the most incredible upheaval in federal substantive law in the history
of the nation between 1963 and 1983, coupled with judicially-created doctrines of ancillary and
pendant [sic] jurisdiction, now codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute.
It’s a new world. It’s a new world that imposes on this Committee problems of enormous
delicacy. And you’re shooting at a moving target, as I say in my written remarks . . . . It’s deja
vu all over again. We had this debate in the ’70s about the utility of the class action. We’re
having it again.
Public Hearing: Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23, at 64–65 (Jan.
17, 1997) (testimony of Professor Arthur D. Miller), in 3 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23 (1997).
47
Letter from Professor Henry N. Butler, Exec. Dir., Searle Ctr. on Law, Regulation & Econ.
Growth, to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal et al. 3 (June 2, 2010) (on file with the Northwestern University
Law Review).
48
See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES
(2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/
Library/Litigation%20Cost%20Survey%20of%20Major%20Companies.pdf. This research effort
collected data on legal expenditures (not including amounts paid to satisfy judgments or settle cases) by
Fortune 200 companies for the period from 2004 to 2008. It contrasted the amounts paid for U.S.
litigation costs and non-U.S. litigation costs. The comparison presented those legal costs as percentages
of revenue—U.S. legal costs as a percentage of U.S. revenue and non-U.S. legal costs as a percentage
of non-U.S. revenues.
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Responsible rulemakers could not regard these sorts of reports as
unimportant. But a virtually simultaneous study by the Federal Judicial
Center showed that usually litigation costs in U.S. federal courts were
reasonably proportional to the stakes involved in the case.49 How can one
reconcile this divergent result? One answer is that the stakes in American
litigation themselves are much higher than in the rest of the world. All of
the factors mentioned above—substantive and procedural—can contribute
to that distinctive result. Exceptional litigation stakes are simply another
aspect of American procedural exceptionalism.
What we are left with now, from this view, is a situation in which the
push for more aggressive reform of American procedure (seemingly
unconsciously) urges that our procedure be made more like the procedure
in the rest of the world. In other words, it is a push for what is in effect
harmonization of American procedure with that of Western Europe and
other industrialized countries. From that perspective, American companies
will no longer be “hobbled” by the burden of American procedural
exceptionalism.
III. THE REDISH CHALLENGE:
DEMOCRATIC THEORY V. THE PERFECT STORM
Marty Redish does not proceed, so far as I know, from the
comparativist or harmonization starting point. Instead, he proceeds from a
theoretical analysis to conclusions that correspond in several instances with

Figure 9 of the study presents those comparisons, and they are striking:
U.S. Costs

Non-U.S. Costs

2004

0.48%

0.11%

2005

0.48%

0.06%

2006

0.56%

0.07%

2007

0.53%

0.06%

2008

0.51%

0.06%

Id. at app. 1, fig.9, at 13. As the study points out, measured in this manner the U.S. costs range from
four times as much to nine times as much. It suffices to emphasize that they are much higher. The
survey was administered and the data were compiled by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and
Economic Growth of the Northwestern University School of Law.
49
See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER NATIONAL, CASEBASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY 28 (2009). Figure 14 shows that more than 50% of plaintiff and defense
lawyers reported that the costs of discovery in the randomly selected case about which the Federal
Judicial Center researchers inquired were “just the right amount” compared to the client’s stakes in the
matter. More specifically, the respondents were asked to respond regarding whether the amount of
discovery in the subject case was too much or too little in light of the client’s stakes in the case. They
were asked to use a scale of 1 to 7, with 4 being “just the right amount,” 1 being too little, and 7 being
too much. More than 55% chose 4. Of the other respondents, roughly half said there was too little
discovery, and half said there was too much. Only about 5% of respondents chose 7 (for far too much
discovery), and the percentage of respondents who chose 3, 4, or 5 was about 80%.
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the perfect storm critique. As mentioned at the outset, this Part takes
liberties with Marty’s work to build a theme. But at arm’s length, it seems
fair to note that his critiques could be a solid foundation for significantly
modifying the broadest view of aggressive private American litigation.
Indeed, at least some have urged corporate general counsels to take note of
his arguments and use them to support dismantling the American litigation
juggernaut.50
I cannot do justice to the democratic theory on which Marty bases his
critique, but I will summarize it as emphasizing that all important
governmental decisions must be made by politically accountable actors.51
That means that neither courts nor rulemakers should be making such
decisions. To some extent, one could counter that critique of the status quo
by emphasizing that most decisions by unelected actors can be
countermanded by elected bodies. Congress, for example, can alter
nonconstitutional results reached by federal courts, and it certainly can
reject or modify anything the rulemakers do. Taking advantage of that
theoretical opportunity is actually extremely difficult, however; the
“stickiness” of American political institutions means that change is very
difficult to accomplish through them. A striking example of that stickiness
50
Thus, Mark Hermann, Vice President and Chief Counsel at Aon, the world’s leading provider of
risk management services, posted a comment on Above The Law urging that in-house counsel focus on
Redish’s book Wholesale Justice:
I understand that nobody reads law review articles or books published by an academic press.
And I wouldn’t condemn any practicing lawyer to reading any issue of a law review from cover
to cover. But I don’t think it’s asking too much to insist that lawyers remain gently abreast of
the academic literature in their field and deploy new ideas aggressively when scholars propose
them. Redish’s book shows why in-house counsel should demand more of their outside lawyers.
Mark Herrmann, Inside Straight: Torpedoing Class Actions, ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 12, 2012, 10:12
AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/01/inside-straight-torpedoing-class-actions.
Hermann explains that he has no firm views on whether Redish’s criticisms of class actions are
right. “But Redish is a smart guy. His ideas are surely plausible, and no law firm would be sanctioned
for making these arguments in a brief. So where are the law firms? Why isn’t every class action defense
firm in America mentioning to clients that these arguments exist?” Id. He explains that law firms have
been “derelict” because “[t]hey should have seized on this issue and started raising it with their clients
the instant Redish’s book was published.” Id. And if law firms are not doing that, their clients should
make them. “Clients should look for lawyers who are at least passingly engaged in the scholarship
surrounding their field of law. Although much scholarship has little relevance to practicing lawyers, a
small chunk of what’s written in the ivory towers could do clients a world of good. Competent lawyers
will embrace those ideas and deploy them to good use.” Id.
Perhaps in somewhat the same vein, a Kirkland & Ellis partner writing in this law review reported:
“Seldom does a work break new ground in a field that has been plowed as often as that of class actions.
Martin Redish’s Wholesale Justice: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of the Class Action
Lawsuit is the rare exception.” Douglas G. Smith, The Intersection of Constitutional Law and Civil
Procedure: Review of Wholesale Justice: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of the Class
Action Lawsuit (Part I), 104 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 775 (2010).
51
The summary in this paragraph could be supported with myriad citations to recent Redish work,
but having run this summary past Redish himself, I think burdening the reader with the citations is not
necessary.
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was the failure to stop the introduction of the initial disclosure requirement
in 1993; although the Clinton Administration favored taking that feature
out of the pending amendment package, and Congress was also almost
unanimously in favor of doing so, a single Senator was able to prevent it
from being done.52
From this perspective, one can identify much that seems quite
important but has emerged not from legislatures but instead from the courts
or the rulemakers. The entire edifice of common law substantive rules—in
particular tort rules like products liability doctrine—was produced mainly
by court decision rather than legislation. One key feature of David Dudley
Field’s more general codification movement (which produced the Field
procedural code) was to supplant common law principles with legislative
provisions. More to the immediate point, a good deal of the metamorphosis
of American litigation that underlies either the perfect cure view or the
perfect storm reaction resulted from decisions by judges (sometimes in the
rulemaking role), not legislative action. In this Part, I will try to catalogue
some of Marty’s provocative challenges to features of modern American
litigation, stressing often that accepting this critique would move U.S.
procedure (and substance) toward a model more like that prevailing in the
rest of the industrialized world. In addition, I will occasionally offer some
reactions to these prescriptions.
Rulemaking authority. Given the centrality of the 1938 adoption of the
Federal Rules, it seems appropriate to begin with a constitutional challenge
to the entire enterprise. In 2006, Marty wrote that the Rules Enabling Act
was on shaky constitutional ground because “many of the Federal Rules
have a dramatic impact on fundamental socio-political and economic
concerns.”53 Congress seemed to have assumed that procedure and
52

Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) prevented a unanimous consent vote in the Senate that
was necessary to produce a bill in time to prevent the rule from going into effect. If one wants to
illustrate the concept of stickiness, this episode could work well. Here’s the story as told by Paul
Carrington, who was then the Advisory Committee’s Reporter:
[T]he [Supreme] Court’s idea that Congress has somehow approved rule changes that it does not
derail should be reappraised by the Court in the light of the events of 1993 regarding the
changes made in Rule 26. Readers will likely recall the brouhaha raised by members of the bar
who felt that fundamental values were threatened by the disclosure requirements authorized by
that amendment. The United States House of Representatives voted unanimously to derail the
[Advisory] Committee’s proposal and substitute one of its own. The House bill was brought
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the day before adjournment when that committee was
acting under a rule requiring unanimity. When Senator Metzenbaum objected to the House bill,
that killed it. And so Rule 26 became law as the result of its support by a single Senator voting
against a unanimous House, a House that would have been joined by an almost unanimous
Senate if the matter had ever reached the Senate floor. The final vote was thus one Senator
against the world, with the one Senator prevailing.
Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The
Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 484–
85 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
53
Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the
Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303,
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substance were totally separate, but as the Supreme Court has noted, “the
rules of procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of
litigants.”54 For this reason, Redish theorizes that rulemaking should be
limited to things readily classified as “housekeeping,” suggesting as an
example Rule 10, which deals with captioning.55
Perhaps obviously given the time I’ve spent working on federal
rulemaking,56 I find this conclusion difficult to accept. To take one topic on
which I’ve worked, consider the 2006 amendments regarding electronic
discovery. Redish points out that many people sought during the public
hearing process to address the Committee about these proposed
amendments, urging that “regulations of electronic discovery will have
important and inescapable implications both for litigants’ ability to enforce
existing substantive law and for businesses of all sizes seeking to operate in
an economically efficient manner.”57 It’s true there were many witnesses
and many public comments on those changes; as the person responsible for
summarizing all the public comment, I’m acutely aware there was a lot of
it. We even had to schedule an extra day of hearings in Washington, D.C.
(on a Saturday, as it happened), to accommodate all who wanted to speak.
But the level of interest does not show that the topics addressed in the
proposed amendments were not “procedural.” For proof of that point,
consider what those amendments actually did: They required that the
parties talk about these issues and report to the judge about them,58
permitted parties making Rule 34 requests to direct that electronically
stored information be produced in specified forms,59 and provided a
procedure to deal with an ongoing problem caused by privilege waiver that
sometimes hamstrung federal litigation.60 Were these problems important in
some cases? Yes. Does that mean rules about them could not be made
through the rulemaking process? I think the answer is “no.”
It is surely true that much of civil procedure “matters” a lot more than
rules like Rule 10 about captions on papers filed in court. If it did not, one
might wonder that we make students take a course in the subject in law
school or why professors spend their lives studying it. But as Professor Ely
said a generation ago, even though arguments can be made at the margins,
it can surely be said that there is a difference between rules of procedure
1303 (2006). It should be noted, however, that the article follows up by acknowledging that “[w]e of
course do not mean to suggest that the constitutionality of the Rules Enabling Act . . . is today in serious
doubt.” Id. at 1305.
54
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989).
55
Redish & Amuluru, supra note 53, at 1325 & n.104.
56
Since 1996, I’ve been the Associate Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. In this
Article, however, I speak entirely for myself and not for that Committee or anyone else.
57
Redish & Amuluru, supra note 53, at 1318.
58
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C).
59
See id. 34(b)(1)(C).
60
See id. 26(b)(5)(B).
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and substantive legal rules.61 Having those specialized procedure rules
devised on a transsubstantive basis by a specialized body seems sensible
and worthwhile.62 And conventional procedural issues hardly seem likely to
stimulate public interest comparable to the public interest in sentencing in
criminal cases, which the Supreme Court has found to be permissibly
regulated by a judicial branch activity.63
Pleading. The Federal Rules’ breakthrough on pleading reached its
high water mark in 1957, when Conley v. Gibson seemed to say that no
case could be dismissed unless the court was certain the plaintiff could
prove no set of facts justifying relief.64 In context, that was a slapdown to
insurgent federal judges who resisted relaxation of pleading requirements.
As a standard, however, it was meaningless; as Professor Hazard put it, this
standard “turned Rule 8 on its head”65 because the rule says that the
pleading must “show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief,”66 but the case
seems to say the plaintiff may move forward unless the complaint shows
that he is not entitled to relief.
As I wrote more than twenty-five years ago, the lower federal courts
continued to scrutinize complaints despite Conley, in part because they
were concerned about the perfect storm aspects of modern American
procedure, particularly broad discovery.67 From time to time, the Supreme
Court would issue a pleading decision, either denouncing or supporting
activity of this sort in specific cases.68 But in Twombly in 200769 and Iqbal
61
See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724–25 (1974)
(footnotes omitted):
We have, I think, some moderately clear notion of what a procedural rule is—one designed to
make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes.
Thus, one way of doing things may be chosen over another because it is thought to be more
likely to get at the truth, or better calculated to give the parties a fair opportunity to present their
sides of the story, or because, and this may point quite the other way, it is a means of promoting
the efficiency of the process. Or the protection of the process may proceed at wholesale, as by
keeping the size of the docket at a level consistent with giving those cases that are heard the
attention they deserve. The most helpful way, it seems to me, of defining a substantive rule . . .
is as a right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not
having to do with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.
62
On the value of transsubstantive rules, see in particular Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to
Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989).
63
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding Sentencing Guidelines against
challenge that they were generated improperly outside the legislative branch).
64
“[W]e follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
65
Hazard, supra note 14, at 1685.
66
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
67
See Marcus, supra note 45, at 444–51.
68
E.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (rejecting plaintiff’s complaint for
failing to provide “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds on which it rests” (quoting
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (overturning a
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in 2009,70 it said that Conley’s “no set of facts” directive had “earned its
retirement” and told lower courts to ask whether plaintiffs’ claims were
“plausible” before allowing cases to proceed to discovery.71
Barely a month after Twombly was announced, Justice Ginsburg (who
dissented) addressed the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit (which
the Court had reversed) and predicted that the Court’s decision “gave
procedure professors cause to write prolifically.”72 She underestimated.
There has probably never been an academic reaction to Supreme Court
decisions of a civil procedure issue to equal the one that greeted Twombly
and Iqbal. One reaction has been that this action by the Court was
inappropriate because it effectively “amended” a rule but did so outside the
rulemaking process. But that might be said of Conley itself; the dividing
line between “interpreting” a rule and “amending” it is sometimes difficult
to discern.
The prevalent academic attitude, however, has stressed the perfect cure
view of modern American procedure and has denounced the Court’s effort
to “shut the courthouse door” before even discovery is allowed. Whether
the Court’s decisions really had that consequence has been feverishly
studied, with inconclusive results.73 To the extent the Court did shut the
door partly, it would seem to have moved in the direction of the rest of the
world, which has long expected plaintiffs to do much more than American
courts ask of American plaintiffs. Consider by contrast the compromise
rule devised for commercial litigation in the Principles of Transnational
Civil Procedure prepared by the ALI and UNIDROIT: “The plaintiff must
state the facts on which the claim is based, describe the evidence to support
those statements, and refer to the legal grounds that support the claim,

Second Circuit requirement that plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits include facts establishing
a prima facie claim in the complaint); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (rejecting Fifth Circuit “heightened pleading” requirement for
cases alleging municipal liability). As a commentator said over thirty years ago, it sometimes seems that
the Court approaches pleading issues with “appalling casualness.” David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading,
Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390, 399 (1980).
69
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
70
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
71
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 562–63.
72
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks at the 2007 Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit
(June 9, 2007), in 278 F.R.D. 268, 272.
73
The Advisory Committee has monitored the lower courts’ decisions, with the resulting
memorandum now nearly 700 pages long. See Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman to the Civil Rules
Committee and Standing Rules Committee (Nov. 23, 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/iqbalmemo_112311.pdf. As Professor Cavanagh has observed:
[The Federal Judicial Center’s March 2011 empirical] study suggests that the lower courts have
been pragmatic—not dogmatic—in construing Twombly and Iqbal; and as the dust from those
decisions continues to settle, it has become increasingly apparent that the parade of horribles
feared by critics has not materialized . . . .
Edward D. Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, 63 S.C. L. REV. 97, 103 (2011) (footnote omitted).

491

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

including foreign law, if applicable.”74 Even plaintiffs who survive this sort
of scrutiny do not usually get discovery in other systems; in the American
system, defendants who cannot challenge the complaint successfully often
face fairly rigorous discovery demands.
Marty Redish has persuasively dissented from the prevailing American
academic view and urged that the Supreme Court’s revision of pleading
standards is sensible, particularly given the growing potential burden of
electronic discovery.75 Meanwhile, the rulemakers continue to monitor the
actual situation (including an updated review of lower court decisions that
is nearly 700 pages long76). The point for the present is that, to the extent
the Court’s decisions moved American pleading rules toward those
prevailing in the rest of the world, they did not move them very far.
Discovery. This is, of course, the most distinctive feature of American
procedure. Much of Continental Europe has operated, at least until recently,
on the assumption that privacy interests should enable a civil litigant to
refuse to divulge any evidence that might hurt her case in court. Indeed,
“[t]he [European] codes of civil procedure of the 19th Century strictly
adhered to the principle nemo tenetur edere contra se, i.e. the principle that
no party has to help her opponent in his/her inquiry into the facts.”77 In the
United States, the closest we come to that sort of attitude is the Fifth
Amendment protection in criminal cases against requiring the accused to be
a witness against himself, a protection not traditionally accorded the
accused on the Continent. The civil litigant in most industrialized countries
is therefore left to try to persuade the judge to demand that the adverse
party produce specified documents.78
Since 1970, the American federal courts have been very different.
Until that year, advance court approval was technically required for Rule
34 requests, but that requirement seemingly was regularly overlooked and
was removed from the rules in the comprehensive 1970 discovery
amendments. On occasion, this wide-open discovery has produced

74
See ALI/UNIDROIT, supra note 11, r. 12.1, at 111 (quoting additional provisions of the
Transnational Rules).
75
See Redish, supra note 6.
76
See Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, supra note 73.
77
Nicolò Trocker, Transnational Litigation, Access to Evidence and U.S. Discovery: Learning
from American ‘Exceptionalism’?, in CURRENT TOPICS OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 145, 156 (Rolf
Stürner & Masanori Kawano eds., 2009); see also Abbo Junker, Access to Documentary Evidence in
German Civil Procedure, in LITIGATION IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY, supra note 20, at 51, 52 (“The
principle applied was that no party must produce a document which is required to win the case of the
opponent.”).
78
This reality has produced at least one notable academic dissent. KUO-CHANG HUANG,
INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW (2003). Huang argues vehemently that American-style
discovery should be imported into civil law and that the burden of proof in civil law should be changed
from its more demanding present requirement to the preponderance of the evidence, as is true for most
subjects in American law.
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remarkable results in terms of revealing evidence critical to accurate
resolution of lawsuits. But it has also produced some less savory
consequences. Not only did some American courts endorse the idea of suits
brought to obtain discovery, rather than substantive relief in court,
American courts for some time endorsed the idea that anything obtained
through discovery could be used for any purpose unless some strong
showing were made to justify a court-imposed limitation on its use.79 Some
suggested that this wide-open attitude threatened unconstitutional takings
as to some property.80 Reacting in part to these circumstances, economists
Robert Cooter and Daniel Rubinfeld urged in 1995 that any discovery
demand that required the responding party to expend more than the value to
the case of the evidence being sought should be regarded as “abusive.”81
The controversy about excessive or abusive discovery continues to
bubble vigorously. Marty Redish has trenchantly criticized the prevalent
notion that the responding party should normally have to shoulder the cost
of responding to discovery requests.82 In part, he echoes the regular
criticism that this arrangement can enable parties with weak claims to
impose huge costs on their adversaries for discovery forays that are
unlikely actually to contribute much to proper resolution of the cases. A
decade ago, he offered an initial critique of the impact of electronic
discovery (already beginning to be appreciated then) on the existing
discovery debate.83 In 2011, he moved beyond that view and got back to
basics, urging that the proper attitude to take toward the burdens of
discovery is not that discovery is a taking or abusive unless well calculated
to produce probative evidence. Instead, the proper attitude is that discovery
provides a governmental subsidy under which the plaintiff gets a free ride.
Fundamental principles of quantum meruit require, he urges, that the
responding party be compensated for the benefit he confers on the other
side by responding to discovery.84
79

See, e.g., San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“It is well-established that the fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the
contrary, presumptively public.”). For a dissenting view, see Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal:
Recognizing (at Last) that the Federal Rules Do Not Declare that Discovery Is Presumptively Public,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 (2006).
80
See Gregory Gelfand, “Taking” Informational Property Through Discovery, 66 WASH. U. L.Q.
703 (1988).
81
Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61
(1995).
82
Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and
Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773 (2011).
For a stronger argument, consider E. Donald Elliott, Twombly in Context: Why Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(b) Is Unconstitutional, 64 FLA. L. REV. 895 (2012), which argues that because being
sued imposes burdens on a defendant, there is a due process right to a preliminary (preservice) review
of the plausibility of the complaint by a judge.
83
Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561 (2001).
84
See Redish & McNamara, supra note 82, at 784–91.
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This is a striking notion. It seems to reverse the Cooter and Rubinfeld
idea that discovery that is unlikely to produce evidence of importance to
the case would be forbidden or allowed only if the party seeking discovery
paid for it.85 To the contrary, it seems that the party seeking discovery is
liable to pay mainly because the discovery produces what Cooter and
Rubinfeld deemed a valid goal of the exercise—probative evidence. For
Redish, the benefits of discovery to the plaintiff are that she does not have
to assemble her evidence by other means, and sometimes that she can get
what she needs to prove her case only by using discovery.86 Frankly, the
notion that the “value” to the plaintiff of the make-or-break internal memo
that proves her discrimination case is equal to the value of the claim would
seem to undercut discovery in the very situations in which it is most
defensible.87
Punitive damages. From the perspective of the rest of the world,
American punitive damages verge on being deplorable; in several countries
American judgments for punitive damages are not entitled to be enforced
even though compensatory damage judgments are. In recent years, the
Supreme Court has returned to the subject fairly frequently, providing some
due process limitations on the award of these damages.88 States have
This message is getting through in some high places. In March 2012, Rep. Trent Franks, Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee’s Constitution Subcommittee, wrote to the judges who serve as
Chairs of the Judicial Conference’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to relay some views developed in a Subcommittee hearing about
discovery matters. Among other things, Rep. Franks cited the Redish and McNamara article’s points
about how discovery in effect requires the responding party to subsidize the requesting party’s
discovery forays. See Letter from Rep. Trent Franks to Hon. Mark R. Kravitz and Hon. David G.
Campbell 4 (Mar. 21, 2012) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).
85
See supra text accompanying note 81.
86
See Redish & McNamara, supra note 82, at 789.
87
A somewhat related subject that Marty Redish has not yet addressed is the “American Rule” that
each side ordinarily pays its own lawyer. That cost is, to a considerable extent, the reason why
responding to discovery is so burdensome. The responding party has to pay its lawyer a lot of money to
review the responsive materials and ready them for production. The recent RAND report on e-discovery
emphasizes this fact; according to that study, 73% of the cost of responding to electronic discovery is
due to document review. See NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, WHERE THE MONEY GOES:
UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY xv (2012).
Perhaps there is an argument that it is unconstitutional to impose that cost on a responding party; if
so, perhaps the “loser pays” attitude of the rest of the world could be advanced in its place. Suffice it to
say that the loser pays rule has been linked to some pathologies where it applies (in England,
particularly); to a certain extent, the American Rule serves to reinforce impulses toward frugality in
litigation while a full-indemnity loser pays rule can strip away any resistance to a litigation arms war.
88
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (endorsing a
four-to-one ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages as “instructive” on the due process
limits); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996) (holding that a punitive damages
award of $2 million was constitutionally excessive because compensatory damages were only $4,000);
see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (adopting a limitation of one to one for
admiralty law—that punitive damages may not exceed compensatory damages—subject to the Court’s
common law jurisdiction).
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developed some innovations of their own, sometimes directing that part of
a punitive damages award go to the state or someone other than the named
plaintiff.89
Marty Redish has not stopped with such half measures. To the
contrary, in 2004 he called for “a radical reconsideration of the entire issue
of punitive damages” on the ground that permitting such awards violates
the central precepts of liberal democratic theory.90 The problem is that
punitive damages serve as a bounty to encourage private actors to enforce
the law,91 a power reserved exclusively to the state. “[T]he concept of
punitive damages represents a perverse transfer of what is inherently public
power to private individuals . . . .”92
Class actions. Though they have been around for a long time,93 class
actions have in the last generation assumed a much higher profile, largely
due to the 1966 amendment to Rule 23. Although a New York Times story
entitled The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit reported in 1988 that
“class actions had their day in the sun and kind of petered out,”94 since then
they have returned to the fore. By the early twenty-first century, it was
reported that “the class action device has changed from the more or less
rare case fought out by titans of the bar in the top financial centers of the
nation to the veritable bread and butter of firms of all shapes and sizes

89
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (West 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (West 2008 &
Supp. 2012). In Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio 2002), the court
ordered that two-thirds of a $30 million punitive award be paid not to the plaintiff but to “a place that
will achieve a societal good, a good that can rationally offset the harm done by the defendants in this
case.” Id. at 146. In times of austerity, there may be a temptation to direct that some of the money go
into the public purse; defendants particularly fear that juries might learn that is where the money they
award goes. See, e.g., Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 476 S.E.2d 565, 567 (Ga. 1996) (holding it
was improper to inform jurors that 75% of the punitive damages award would go into the state
treasury); Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Or. 1990) (holding that it was
improper to tell jurors that part of a punitive damages award would go to the state’s Criminal Injuries
Compensation Account).
90
Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitutional,
53 EMORY L.J. 1, 52 (2004). For competing views receptive to the use of punitive damages, see, e.g.,
William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629 (1999) (arguing on
grounds of economic efficiency that punitive damages should be available in all cases of breach of
contract, or at least willful breach of contract); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal
Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003) (urging that punitive damages be understood not only to provide
retribution, deterrence, or both, but also as a form of “societal compensation” to redress harms the
defendant has inflicted on others as well as the individual plaintiff).
91
Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1393, 1451 (1993).
92
Redish & Mathews, supra note 90, at 3.
93
See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION (1987) (tracing the modern class action back to precedents in medieval litigation in England on
behalf of groups).
94
Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1988, at B7
(quoting Paul Carrington, the official Reporter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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across the country.”95 In 2005, Congress recognized its importance by
passing the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).96
Consistent with his view of the proper limits of the rulemaking power,
Marty Redish has challenged the constitutionality of the use of that power
to reformulate the rule in 1966, devoting an entire book to the challenge.
He recognizes that accepting this view would mean that “there can be little
question that the class action as we have come to know it in recent years
could not survive.”97 Nonetheless, the problem is that the class action
changes the “DNA” of the underlying law, particularly when it results in
weighty lawsuits where none would otherwise be filed. The problem, in his
view, is that the class action is so important that it could only be adopted by
legislative action by those accountable to the voters. This is the book that a
general counsel exhorted other in-house lawyers at companies that might
find themselves facing class actions to examine carefully.98
As a reaction, it must be emphasized that this view of class actions has
not enjoyed much favor in the courts. True, the Supreme Court and the
lower courts approach the use of class actions with a considerable nod to
the need to avoid going beyond the rulemaking power.99 But the Supreme
Court’s Shady Grove decision100 does much to weaken that argument.
There, the Court confronted a claim entirely dependent on New York law
for a penalty against insurers who fail to pay claims on time. When an
insurer fails to pay, this New York law permits the victim to sue and collect
a penalty (and attorney’s fees). But the New York legislature was alert to
the possibility that the impact of such laws might be inflated beyond their
purpose if class actions could aggregate such penalty claims, so it directed
also that class actions in New York courts would not be allowed for actions
for penalties unless the legislature explicitly authorized them.101 Due to
CAFA, however, the plaintiff in Shady Grove was able to sue in federal
court and to seek class certification under Rule 23. Faced with the New
York legislature’s effort to calibrate enforcement of state law, Justice
95

Benjamine Reid & Chris S. Coutroulis, Checkmate in Class Actions: Defensive Strategy in the
Initial Moves, LITIG., Winter 2002, at 21, 21.
96
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
97
MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 53 (2009).
98
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
99
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999) (“The Rules Enabling Act
underscores the need for caution.”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612–13 (1997)
(“Rule 23’s requirements must be interpreted in keeping with . . . the Rules Enabling Act . . . .”).
100
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
101
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (MCKINNEY 2006) (“Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a
minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to
recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be
maintained as a class action.”).
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Ginsburg favored respecting the state legislators’ choice,102 but the majority
held that Rule 23 applied and the misgivings of the state legislators did not
matter. It is difficult to imagine a more striking example of the sort of
contretemps that Redish emphasizes.103
*

*

*

This summary admittedly does not come close to doing justice to
Marty’s thorough and thoughtful dissection of a wide variety of topics.
Instead, it is intended to emphasize that his work provides a theoretical
basis—grounded in liberal democratic theory—for retreating from the
perfect cure view of much modern American procedure, and also provides
noninstrumentalist grounds for curtailing many perfect storm aspects of
American exceptionalism. I have indulged in a few reactions to these
arguments merely to provide perspective on how striking they are. The
main point is that—whether or not Marty so intended—adopting wholesale
his panoply of arguments would tend to move American procedure very
much in the direction of European procedure and that prevailing in the rest
of the world. It is thus a constitutional argument for what is, in effect,
harmonization of many procedural differences between the United States
and the rest of the world.
IV. ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL THEORIES FOR AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
The pervasive persuasiveness of Redish’s invocation of liberal
democratic theory to challenge the whole structure of American procedural
exceptionalism invites consideration of competing political theories.
Though confident more can be identified, I will turn to three different kinds
of justification. All depend, in some sense, on the role of American
procedure in applying public law through private litigation. I will, finally,
contrast a fourth political theory analysis that does not fit the American
model.

102

See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
It should be emphasized that this does not mean that Redish disagrees with the decision if one
accepts that Rule 23 was properly promulgated. Then the question is whether the rule directs that the
propriety of a class action in federal court should be governed by the rule’s provisions even if the
claims asserted were created by state law. On this point, Justice Ginsburg (and three others) tried to
sidestep the rule. But Justice Stevens agreed with the Court that the rule had to be applied (having
concluded that it was valid) and rejected Justice Ginsburg’s efforts to avoid that result even though he
generally found her views to provide a more nuanced view of the application of the Rules Enabling Act.
Id. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring).
103
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A. Solving the Problem of Enforcing Public Law Without Creating a
Strong State
Marty Redish’s critique of contemporary American procedure often
emphasizes the need for public authorities to implement public values. But
private litigation is often justified as doing the same thing. Indeed, in the
view of Professor Chayes104 and Professor Fiss105 a generation ago, that
might be seen as its main goal. Even now, some seem to deny that the
perfect storm argument has any validity and emphasize that those who
advance these concerns are solely attempting to blunt the enforcement of
the law.
The notion that private enforcement is inimical to orderly democracy
is not universal. Professor Kagan, a political scientist, has long charted the
ways in which “adversarial legalism,” in his phrase, actually implements
distinctive American political attitudes. As he explains:
[A]dversarial legalism in the United States has been stimulated by a
fundamental mismatch between a changing legal culture and an inherited set
of political attitudes and structures. Americans have attempted to articulate
and implement the socially transformative policies of an activist, regulatory
welfare state through the political and legal institutions of a decentralized,
nonhierarchical governmental system.106

Professor Burke, another political scientist, agrees: “[T]he distinctive
aspects of the structure of American government, particularly judicial
independence and separation of powers, create a strong incentive for
activists of all stripes to favor litigious policies. And this in turn helps to
explain the distinctively litigious policy style of the United States.”107
The very elements of American procedural exceptionalism, then, seem
to be addressed to the distinctive tradition of Americans to resist
concentrated governmental power. Litigation opportunities empower large
numbers of citizens to pursue relief in court. Lax pleading standards and
broad discovery are the tools by which they can do so. Those who bemoan
the prospect that the doors to the courthouse are closing are not only
voicing fondness for the classic civil rights structural litigation of a
generation ago, but are more generally embracing a public attitude of
growing vitality in these Tea Party times that make mistrust of
governmental institutions the centerpiece of discussion.
Yes, this arrangement enables private actors to control the
implementation of public policy in important ways, and sometimes to
frustrate important public goals for selfish reasons. Yes, adopting pleading
rules like those in the rest of the world would curtail that ability, and
104
105
106
107
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constricting discovery would also. But one who seeks to do so runs into
forceful arguments. Thus Judge Higginbotham, former Chair of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, warned in 1997:
The revolution in procedure wrought by the changes of the 1938 rules has
served us well for an extraordinary period of time. Over the years access to
the powerful federal engine of discovery has become central to a wide array
of social policies. Congress has elected to use the private suit, private
attorneys-general as an enforcing mechanism for the anti-trust laws, the
securities laws, environmental laws, civil rights and more. In the main, the
plaintiff in these suits must discover his evidence from the defendant.
Calibration of discovery is calibration of the level of enforcement of the
social policy set by Congress.108

At the same time, Dean Carrington, a former Reporter of the Advisory
Committee, issued a related admonition:
Private litigants do in America much of what is done in other industrial
states by public officers working within an administrative bureaucracy.
Every day, hundreds of American lawyers caution their clients that an
unlawful course of conduct will be accompanied by serious risk of exposure
at the hands of some hundreds of thousands of lawyers, each armed with a
subpoena power by which misdeeds can be uncovered. Unless corresponding
new powers are conferred on public officers, constricting discovery would
diminish the disincentives for lawless behavior across a wide spectrum of
forbidden conduct.109

Those who calculate the costs of private litigation in this country and
compare similar costs in other countries probably do not account for the
increased costs (and intrusion) that result from direct governmental law
enforcement in those countries. Of course, it may be that there are no
similar efforts at enforcement by administrative or other means in those
other countries, but the political science predicate for the work of
Professors Kagan and Burke is that the populations of Western Europe do
want and expect a similar level of legal protection, but accept a much more
pervasive state as a way to provide it. As emphasized in Part V, calculating
what is the right amount of clout for plaintiffs, or protection for defendants,
often presents nice questions. The point here is that adopting procedures
that facilitate private enforcement—even “subsidize” it—is not inherently
politically indefensible, and that leaving enforcement using those
procedural tools in private hands is not politically indefensible either.
Recent frustration with American administrative enforcement of
constraints on business before and during the financial crisis underscore
these points. The recurrent assertion that the SEC had been too easy on the

108
109

Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1997).
Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997) (footnote omitted).
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bankers is only one illustration.110 Americans are not necessarily willing to
leave the enforcement of public policy entirely to public officials.
B. The “Lesser Evil” Political Explanation for Private Enforcement
Professor Farhang’s 2010 book The Litigation State111 offers another
explanation for our regime of private enforcement dependent on permissive
procedures. It focuses primarily on the adoption of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. As that bill was making its way through Congress, the
strong preference of its liberal democratic supporters was to empower the
EEOC to enforce the new protections against discrimination. The leaders of
civil rights groups felt the same way.112 But conservative Southern
Democrats in the Senate could be counted upon to filibuster any civil rights
bill, so the liberals needed Republican votes to pass the legislation.113
The Republicans opposed enforcement by the EEOC. They claimed
that the EEOC would engage in “the excessive bureaucratic regulation of
business that was characteristic of the NLRB, and of so much
administrative state-building since the New Deal.”114 Thus, “the key move
of Republicans in the Senate, led by Dirksen, was to substantially privatize
the prosecutorial function. They made private lawsuits the dominant mode
of Title VII enforcement, creating an engine that would, in the years to
come, produce levels of private enforcement litigation beyond their
imagining.”115 As Farhang observes in the first sentence of the book: “Next
to petitions by prisoners to be set free, job discrimination lawsuits are the
single largest category of litigation in federal courts.”116
A few years later, the same scenario was played out again in regard to
the Fair Housing Act: “Private litigation was again offered by conservative
Republicans as a substitute for bureaucratic state-building, and it again
commanded broader consensus than the administrative power sought by
liberal civil rights advocates.”117 Thereafter, during the period 1965–1976,

110

See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785 (2009);
Joanna Chung, SEC to Enlist Help on Fraud, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at 15.
111
SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE
U.S. (2010).
112
Thus, Professor Engstrom reports that right after World War II leading civil rights groups
“coalesced around the idea of an administrative agency as the exclusive means of enforcement” and
stuck to this preference “despite growing evidence that courts and litigation might offer the better
course.” David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law: Regulatory
Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943–1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1073–74, 1076
(2011).
113
For a detailed review of these events, see FARHANG, supra note 111, at 94–128.
114
Id. at 100.
115
Id. at 106.
116
Id. at 3.
117
Id. at 120.
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the same mode of enforcement was included in a wide range of protective
regimes enacted by Congress.118
It may be that the Republican legislators who favored this arrangement
would not have done so had they been able to foresee how dramatically
private enforcement could implement such public norms. It may be that
they did not appreciate that—particularly when coupled with fee-shifting
legislation—these private enforcement measures would lead to the
development of an entire sector of the bar that built successful practices on
bringing such cases. The contemporary “public interest bar” did emerge,
however. And it may well be that they did not fully appreciate that the class
action could combine with some of these statutes to magnify the
enforcement power.
But Professor Farhang offers some astute political explanations for
legislative preference for private enforcement in the American legal
system, with its separation of powers and independent judiciary.119 Any
given Congress might worry about how later elections could dilute the
Executive Branch’s enthusiasm for the programs it adopted. Relying on an
administrative agency to enforce such programs could be risky. A telling
example pertinent to the Title VII story is the behavior of the EEOC after
Clarence Thomas became its head. Private litigants pursuing remedies in
court and private lawyers pursuing fee awards do not, of course, follow the
election returns in the same way. The “stickiness” of American political
processes made it unlikely a subsequent Congress would undo the private
enforcement machinery this one had passed, and private litigants could
invoke judicial enforcement no matter how the new Administration or
Congress felt about the goals of this Congress.
Similarly, having independent federal judges interpreting the
provisions of those laws might insulate them from the consequences of
electoral reverses in a way that relying on public enforcement controlled by
the Executive would not. In fact, proponents of civil rights laws often were
pleased by the judges’ interpretation of the provisions Congress had
adopted:
At the very time the executive branch moved rightward on civil rights
with Nixon’s assumption of office, the federal courts were issuing far more
liberal interpretations of Title VII . . . than most observers had expected.
Civil rights groups were jubilant at the judiciary’s substantive elaboration of
Title VII doctrine . . . . By the late 1960s, civil rights advocates judged that
federal courts were actually their ideological allies, which fueled their
preference for implementation through private enforcement regimes.120

118
119
120

For a review of these developments, see id. at 129–71.
This paragraph summarizes chapter two of FARHANG, supra note 111, at 19–59.
Id. at 165.
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In the face of this history, there is much to be said for the view that our
current private enforcement regime actually embodies the results of
American democratic political processes, whether or not it also is entirely
consistent with liberal democratic theory. Indeed, considering more
particularly the notion that rulemaking and other judicial activity that
affects resolution of litigation somehow subverts the democratic process,
another political scientist counters: “[T]o the extent that courts and judges
have become central to American politics, it is because elected politicians
have actively, repeatedly, and strategically assisted them in becoming
so.”121 He therefore rejects what he describes as “a paranoid skepticism that
judicial power was ‘stolen’ from the people and their representatives.”122
C. The Jury Trial and Democratic Decisionmaking
The third explanation is more tentative and perhaps a symptom of a
lost era. It might also be advanced as a reason for embracing some of the
changes Marty has urged for other reasons because they might increase the
frequency of trial, which has become less and less frequent over the last
century. A first vision of American democracy emphasizes quite a different
set of concerns from those advanced in Redish’s recent work. In some
ways, it seems to rely on a lost way of doing judicial business—frequent
jury trials in which citizen-jurors applied general rules of law to decide
particular disputes. At its most vibrant, that can be viewed as what
constitutional guarantees of jury trial seek to ensure.
There is surely something to the notion that jury trials played a role in
the American political fabric. As an illustration, consider Professor
Feldman’s description of trials handled by future Justice Robert Jackson in
his early legal practice about a century ago:
With the financial stakes typically tiny, the cases Jackson took early in his
career were as much theater as they were law. The local community treated a
day’s worth of trials as entertainment. Court was not held before a judge, but
in front of a justice of the peace who was not a lawyer. Trials took place not
in a regular courtroom, but wherever there was space to gather: in a school, a
church, or the dance hall of a Masonic Temple. One time, Jackson recalled,
121
JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY 272 (2012). With particular regard to the Rules
Enabling Act, Professor Crowe observes:
[T]he Rules Enabling Act was actually more important than the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure—and would have remained so regardless of what the Court did (or did not do) with
the power delegated to it. The sheer fact that Congress was compelled to delegate power to the
Court in the first place suggests that the federal judiciary had arrived as a power player on the
national political scene. For an institution that had long had even its most mundane institutional
arrangements dictated to it by Congress, the legislative cession of the power to make rules—the
power to make procedural law, in essence—governing judicial practice across the entire nation
can only be regarded as a momentous step toward the realization of full institutional
independence and autonomy.
Id. at 224.
122
Id. at 271.
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when the justice of the peace did not have room in his house, “we put up
some oil lanterns, put some boards across potato crates for people to sit on,
and we tried the case in the barn.”123

Perhaps this community involvement was an important reason why jury
trial did not disappear in this country. At roughly the same time, it was
slipping away in England,124 even though the whole notion of jury trial
originated there.
As recently as the 1980s, courts still declared that trial was “the
centerpiece of the litigation,”125 but declining trial rates have made this
assertion hard to justify nowadays. That decline can be traced to many
things, including the impact of increased criminal enforcement, the
growing costs of pretrial preparation, including extensive discovery in
some cases, and the increasing stakes involved in cases tried to
conclusion—the “bet the company” scenario.126
This decline can be viewed as diminishing American democracy.
Professors Burbank and Subrin have recently reacted to the decline in the
trial rate by emphasizing that, “[s]ince the founding of our country, trials in
open court resulting in decisions by either a judge or a jury have been
thought to be constitutive of American democracy.”127 They posit that the
Bill of Rights was critical to the founding of the country, and add: “There
would not have been an acceptable Bill of Rights without a right to trial by
jury. Distrust of concentrated authority is a central feature of our system of
government.”128 Jury trial was a way of assuring that this form of
democracy would thrive on “citizen’s justice”:
[M]any legal norms need community input for the decisions applying them
to be accepted by that community. Issues such as negligence, intentional
discrimination, material breach of contract, and unfair competition are not
facts capable of scientific demonstration. Nor are these issues pure questions
of law. Rather, they are concepts mixing elements of fact and law that
become legitimate behavioral norms when the citizenry at large, acting
through jury representatives, decides what the community deems
acceptable.129

This vision of the role of trials in particular, and private civil litigation
in general, has on occasion played a critical role in the development of the
123
NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES 45 (2010).
124
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
125
Walters v. Inexco Oil Co., 440 So. 2d 268, 275 (Miss. 1983).
126
For a set of reactions to the decline in the frequency of trials in the United States, see
Symposium, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
127
Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401 (2011).
128
Id. at 402 (footnote omitted).
129
Id. at 401–02.
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distinctive American way of litigation. A key example is the trial bar’s
fight to prevent the adoption of no-fault insurance schemes in place of the
right to sue in court. As recounted by Professor Witt, the trial lawyers had
to take on powerful labor unions to resist the move away from trial in court
as the main route to compensation for injury. “[E]ven as the New Deal
sought to replace courts, juries, and trial lawyers with efficient bureaucratic
agencies, the trial lawyers contended that those same common-law
institutions could best carry out the vision of the New Deal.”130 The trial
lawyers looked to courts “as an institution for a new kind of regulatory
activity that adapted New Deal notions to the institutions of the common
law.”131 These developments led to the sorts of effects we have heard about
recently:
Between 1950 and 1959, . . . the total expenditures in the American tort
system increased threefold. By the end of the twentieth century, the costs of
the tort system as a share of gross domestic product reached 2.3 percent,
almost twice as great a share as the next leading industrialized nation state
(Italy), and almost four times as great as the United Kingdom.132

From this perspective, the recent critique of aspects of American
procedural exceptionalism presents a possibly mixed bag. Arguably,
discovery costs could impede the assertion of claims, although it seems that
those who consistently emphasize that point are often allied with what
might be called the defense side of litigation; few plaintiff lawyers urge
that discovery be curtailed to expedite their ability to get cases to trial.
Heightening pleading standards, lowering potential recoveries for pain and
suffering, removing punitive damages from the table, and curtailing jury
trial would surely not serve the interests of this democratic impulse.
In many ways, this perspective is consistent, therefore, with the prior
two—private enforcement serves American democratic goals in a distinctly
American way. But the vibrancy of private enforcement depends
significantly on American procedural exceptionalism. That suggests that
some versions of democratic theory need not wholly favor moving toward
more vigorous procedural harmonization with the rest of the world.
D. Questioning a Political Theory for Procedural Configuration
Thus far, this Article has suggested three political theories that would
explain (and perhaps to some extent justify) some of the distinctive features
of American procedure. As a counterpoint, it seems worthwhile briefly to
note one that does not. Specifically, a generation ago Professor Damaška, a
comparativist, undertook an ambitious effort to relate procedural
arrangements at the most general level to the political organization of
130
131
132
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societies.133 It’s an exceptionally informative and intriguing work. For our
purposes, however, the problem is that the theory really seems not to
connect with the American reality.
Professor Damaška presents a dichotomy of procedural arrangements
that correspond to two types of states. One he describes as the “reactive”
state and the other the “activist” state.134 The former contemplates a
relatively limited role for government, while the latter, as the label
“activist” suggests, relies on an interventionist governmental attitude. The
procedural arrangements for the reactive state look very much like the
American setup, with emphasis on party control of the case, concentrated
proceedings, and reliance on live testimony and “day in court” aspects.135
The policy-implementing method, on the other hand, seems like the
communist countries of the former Soviet bloc (quite extant when Damaška
was writing), relying on pervasive official control of the litigation process
and routine hierarchical intervention to control courts of first instance.136 It
is an exceptionally elegant picture.
The United States is easy to fit into this picture; with its reliance on
jury trial, limited opportunity to appeal under the final judgment rule, and
relatively weak state, it may be the prototype of the reactive state. The only
problem is that this overlooks the enforcement feature of American private
litigation. Damaška recognizes that anomaly, entitling the last subsection in
his book “Contemporary Activist Justice in America.”137 In this section, he
says that the public interest cases described by Professor Chayes138
presented “perplexing examples” because although “public interest
litigation retains overtones of ‘reactive’ justice,” “the traditional
arrangements of civil procedure became an increasingly transparent cover
for what is essentially a policy-implementing process.”139
In the end, he throws up his hands, declaring that “public interest
litigation more and more resembles the marsupial wolf that only looks like
a wolf, but is actually a sort of opossum.”140 In this surrender, he offers a
foretaste of the analysis set forth fifteen years later by Professor Kagan141:
The rise into prominence of American public interest litigation is . . .
intimately linked to a governmental structure in which authority is widely
distributed. Where there are so many checks and balances, the realization of
activist ideas is a difficult enterprise: vehement controversy over policy
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
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alternatives produces more animated stand-stills than discernible movement.
What remains to an activist group, frustrated by stalemates in other branches
of government, is to find a “coordinate” judge who agrees with its notion of
desirable change and is willing to take public interest litigation in hand. Thus
a program that can, in differently structured activist states, be formulated in
the legislature and implemented by vigorous executive action has its last
chance in American courts: an independent and powerful judge, with the
legacy of his ill-defined powers still strongly present, can be at once a
minilegislature, an administrator, and a player of the more specific judicial
role.142

So we must be cautious about the validity of political theory as a
measure for procedural arrangements, and perhaps also about bomb
throwing in the house of procedure that seeks to implement political theory.
V. THE CHALLENGES OF PROCEDURAL REFORM IN THIS ENVIRONMENT
One conclusion to be drawn from this ambiguity is that grand themes
have limited utility in adjusting procedural rules. They can be marshaled to
support (or oppose) many of the sorts of changes that are energetically
endorsed nowadays. Some seem to favor strengthening the hands of
plaintiffs at every turn.143 Others, somewhat along the lines of Marty
Redish, find reasons why curtailing or limiting the options available to
plaintiffs should often be pursued. Certainly non-academics lobby for quite
aggressive efforts to shut down the private enforcement regime that
continues to typify American procedure.144
For those called upon to navigate this maelstrom, one source of
guidance would be what Marty calls “first order” issues dealing with basic
policy values that should be served by the procedural system.145 Others
have similarly urged the rulemakers to emphasize such values.146 Certainly
efforts like Marty’s litigation matrix provide useful guidance.
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That guidance regularly does not seem to answer the sorts of questions
that the rulemakers must try to answer, however. Unless one adopts the
version of liberal democratic theory that Redish expounds, for instance,
alternative analyses like those in the previous Part may point toward
retaining or strengthening provisions that Redish would dismantle. Moving
beyond dismantling for the purpose of dismantling, then, leaves difficult
judgments to be made. All should be able to agree that it would be
undesirable for courts to empower plaintiffs to extort unjustified
settlements from defendants by neglecting any judicial scrutiny of the
validity of claims at the pleading stage and enabling plaintiffs to use
discovery to inflict such cost on defendants that they have no choice but to
pay tribute. That, after all, has been the specter haunting the liberal ethos of
mid-twentieth century American procedure for nearly two generations.
But most would deplore retracting our existing procedural provisions
to the point where plaintiffs with valid claims routinely have no meaningful
enforcement. That, of course, is sometimes a prime argument in favor of
the class action device. Marty’s critique that the class action transforms the
DNA of substantive rights might in that instance suggest that it does so by
making real those rights that would otherwise be empty. As he
acknowledges, “If the individual injuries recognized by the substantive law
are so small as not to justify the individual victim’s decision to enforce
them, then the rights will not be enforced.”147 Perhaps it is consistent with
some versions of democratic theory for the legislature to enact protections
fully expecting that they will not be enforceable and will not be enforced;
procedural shortchanging could well serve as a sleight of hand to such
ends. But it becomes more difficult to articulate that goal as one rulemakers
should embrace.
Given these competing considerations, the rulemakers may often focus
on “second order” problems—how most pragmatically to balance the
considerations that matter in adjusting the system they have. Indeed, some
urge that the tethers of the private enforcement system be applied to the
public enforcers.148 The path to theoretical clarity may be beyond current
rulemakers; muddiness will instead afflict them.
In this environment, empirical questions may often dominate
theoretical ones. It is certain that dubious empirical assertions abound in
the debates about procedural matters. And it sometimes seems that more
disciplined work itself is attacked for ideological reasons. In the fog of
these procedural wars, those making the choices make the best ones they
can, but don’t assume they are the only ones that could be made. It would
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surely be desirable to be able to offer more definite prescriptions, but that
seems presently too difficult, and perhaps even perilous.
CONCLUSION
Marty Redish does not expect the muddy reality described in the last
Part to disappear soon. To the contrary, while repeatedly challenging the
status quo he recognizes that it is likely to remain as it is.149 A Supreme
Court that decided Shady Grove in 2010 is unlikely soon thereafter to shift
course and determine that the entirety of Rule 23 is unconstitutional. True,
the Court has made some striking changes of direction in recent years. One
of the most striking is Crawford v. Washington,150 which reconceptualized
the Confrontation Clause. One pertinent to civil procedure would be Finley
v. United States,151 which suddenly abandoned and denounced the federal
courts’ accrual of jurisdiction through doctrines like pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction. But about-faces are very rare, even in reaction to bomb
throwing.
At the same time, American civil procedure owes a great debt of
gratitude to Marty Redish in large measure because he has been willing to
throw academic bombs. He has not done so because he enjoys bomb
throwing. And he hardly needed to do so to get attention, as some academic
bomb throwers may; Redish’s eminence has long been assured. Instead, he
launches fundamental challenges because they flow from his rigorous
analysis of basic policy issues. We all need to be reminded of those basic
issues lest we become completely mired in everyday problems. That does
not mean, however, that the prescriptions that result will quickly be
adopted.
Instead, the American preference for private enforcement seems likely
to continue.152 And enthusiasm for this sort of activity may actually spread
beyond our shores. Professor Farhang explained that our Congress might

149
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favor private enforcement because it would set in motion enforcement
activities that subsequent elections could not stop.153 The European Union
might be said to confront similar problems of enforcement if its enactments
depend on decisions by national governments with different priorities.
Consider Professor Kelemen’s recent book on the emergence of
“Eurolegalism,” a variant of American adversarial legalism as described by
Professor Kagan:
Eurolegalism is emerging as a quite unexpected—and in many circles
unwanted—stepchild of European integration. Together, the EU’s
institutional structure and its ongoing project of market integration generate
political incentives and functional pressures . . . for private enforcement. In
other words, adversarial legalism is emerging in Europe for much the same
reason it emerged decades earlier in the United States. As Kagan has
emphasized, in the US case, the combination of “fragmented governmental
authority” and “fragmented economic power” was crucial to the emergence
of adversarial legalism. In the United States, regulation through litigation
emerged as a tool of a weak, highly fragmented state attempting to regulate
an expansive and highly liberalized economy. So too in Europe.154

Maybe, then, some harmonization will actually turn out to favor America’s
“exceptional” procedures more than one would recently have thought
possible. Only time will tell. But as we confront these issues we will owe a
debt to bomb throwers like Marty Redish who force us to face the hard
problems.
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